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I. INTRODUCTION: MARITAL STORIES
The climax of Harvey Fierstein's 1979 play Torch Song Trilogy
is a dialogue - well, shouting match - between mother and
son about traditional marriage and its gay variant. As is fre-
quently the case, the nature and function of an institution flashes
forth only when the institution breaks down or is dissolved -
here by the death of Arnold's lover.
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Urbana. B.A.
University of Chicago; Ph.D. University of Toronto.
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Arnold: [I'm] widow-ing.
Ma: Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. Are you trying to compare my
marriage with you and Alan? Your father and I were married for
thirty-five years, had two children and a wonderful life together.
You have the nerve to compare yourself to that?
What loss did you have?... Where do you come to compare that
to a marriage of thirty-five years?
It took me two months until I could sleep in our bed alone, a
year to learn to say "I" instead of "we." Are you going to tell me
you were "widowing." How dare you!
Arnold: You're right, Ma. How dare I. I couldn't possibly know
how it feels to pack someone's clothes in plastic bags and watch
the garbage-pickers carry them away. Or what it feels like to for-
get and set his place at the table. How about the food that rots in
the refrigerator because you forgot how to shop for one? How
dare I? Right, Ma? How dare I?
Ma: May God strike me dead! Whatever I did to my mother to
deserve a child speaking to me this way. The disrespect!
Arnold: Listen, Ma, you had it easy. You have thirty-five years to
remember, I have five. You had your children and friends to
comfort you, I had me! My friends didn't want to hear about it.
They said "What're you gripin' about? At least you had a lover."
'Cause everybody knows that queers don't feel nothin'. How
dare I say I loved him? You had it easy, Ma. You lost your hus-
band in a nice clean hospital, I lost mine out there. They killed
him there on the street. Twenty-three years old, laying dead on
the street. Killed by a bunch of kids with baseball bats. Children.
Children taught by people like you. 'Cause everybody knows that
queers don't matter! Queers don't love! And those that do
deserve what they get!'
In its representation both of the day-to-day nature of gay
relationships and of the injustices which beset these relationships
because they are not socially, let alone legally, acknowledged as
marriages, Fierstein's moving fictional account has its roots deep
in the real life experience of lesbian and gay couples. Consider
three true-life stories of gay couples:
Years of domesticity have made Brian and Ed familiar figures
in the archipelago of middle-aged, middle-class couples who
1. HARvEY FIERSTEIN, TORCH SONG TRILOGY 144-46 (1979).
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make up my village's permanent gay male community. Ed drives
a city bus. Brian is a lineman for the power company - or
rather he was until a freak accident set aflame the cherry-picker
atop which he worked. He tried to escape by leaping to a nearby
tree, but lost his grip and landed on his head. Eventually, it
became clear that Brian would be permanently brain-damaged.
After a few awkward weeks in the hospital, Brian's parents
refused to let Ed visit anymore. Eventually they moved Brian to
their village and home, where Ed was not allowed.
A similar case garnered national attention. In Minnesota,
Karen Thompson fought a seven-year legal battle to gain guardi-
anship of her lover, Sharon Kowalski. Sharon was damaged of
body and mind in a 1983 car accident, after which Sharon's par-
ents barred Karen for years from seeing her.2 Although the Min-
nesota tragedy made headlines, the causes of such occurrences
are everyday stuff in gay and lesbian lives. In both Sharon and
Karen's and Brian and Ed's cases, if the government had through
marriage allowed the members of each couple to be next-of-kin
for each other, the stories would have had different endings -
ones in keeping with our cultural belief that in the first instance
those to whom we as adults entrust our tendance in crisis are
people we choose, our spouses, who love us because of who we
are, not people who are thrust upon us by the luck of the draw
and who may love us only in spite of who we are.3
On their walk back from their neighborhood bar to the Vic-
torian which, over the years, they had lovingly restored, Warren
and Mark stopped along San Francisco's Polk Street to pick up
milk for breakfast and for Sebastian, their geriatric cat. Just for
kicks, some wealthy teens from the Valley drove into town to
"bust some fags." Warren dipped into a convenience store, while
Mark had a smoke outside. As Mark turned to acknowledge War-
ren's return, he was hit across the back of the head with a base-
ball bat. Mark's blood and vomit splashed across Warren's face.
In 1987, a California appellate court held that under no circum-
stance can a relationship between two homosexuals - however
emotionally significant, stable, and exclusive - be legally consid-
ered a "close relationship," and so Warren was barred from
2. See KAREN THOMPSON & JULIE ANDRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON
Kowmsm COME HOME? (1988).
3. Eventually, Thompson did get guardianship of Kowalski, but only after
Kowalski's parents withdrew from the field of battle. A Minnesota appeals court
held that "this choice [of guardianship] is further supported by the fact that
Thompson and Sharon are a family of affinity, which ought to be accorded
respect." In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Minn. 1991).
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bringing any suit against the bashers for negligently causing emo-
tional distress.4
Gay and lesbian couples are living together as married peo-
ple do, even though they are legally barred from getting married.
The legally aggravated injustices contained in the stories above
suggest both that this bar deserves a close examination and that
the law, if it aims at promoting justice, will have to be attentive
and responsive to the ways couples actually live their lives rather
than, as at present, pre-emptively and ignorantly determining
which relationships are to be acknowledged and even created by
it. America stands at a point where legal tradition is largely a
hindrance to understanding what the law should be.
In this article, I advocate the legalization of gay marriage.5
My analysis does not in the main proceed by appeal to the con-
cept.of equality; in particular, nothing will turn on distinctive fea-
tures of equal protection doctrine. Rather, the analysis is
substantive and turns on understanding the nature and meaning
of marriage itself.
To count as a marriage, a relation must fulfill certain norma-
tive conditions. Marriage is norm-dependent. In the first half of
the article, I examine this aspect of marriage. First, in part II-A I
examine the going social and legal definitions of marriage and
find them all wanting. I then in part II-B tender a substantive,
non-stipulative definition of marriage that is centered and analyt-
ically based on the norms which inform the way people actually
live as couples. I go on to show that gay couples in fact meet this
definition.
But marriage is also norm-invoking: when a relation is deter-
mined to be a marital one, that property, in turn, has normative
consequences. In particular, it invokes a certain understanding
of the relation of marriage to government. And so, part III of
this article examines, along several dimensions, various norma-
tive consequences and legal reforms that are suggested by the
values that inform marriage. Along the way, I suggest that the
lived experience of gay couples not only shows them as fulfilling
the norms of marriage but can even indicate ways of improving
marital law for everyone. The article concludes in Part IV with
an examination of the social, religious, and legal reforms that are
under way toward the recognition and support of gay marital
relationships. Part of the chore of plumping for radical legal
4. Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
5. As a subsidiary matter, I also advocate domestic partnership legislation
to the extent that such legislation is a determinate step toward the realization of
gay legal marriage and not a distraction from or new hurdle to this goal. See
infra part IV.
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reform is to show that the reform is in fact possible - and that it
does not cause the skies to fall.
II. DEFINITIONS OF MARRIAGE: ITS NORMATIVE CONTENT
A. Definitional Failures
1. Social and Legal Attempts to Define Marriage
Usually in religious, ethical, and legal thinking, issues are
settled with reference to a thing's goodness. Yet oddly, the
debate over gay marriage has focused not on whether the thing is
good but on whether the thing can even exist. Those opposing
gay marriage say that the very definition of marriage rules out the
possibility that gay couples can be viewed as married.6
If one asks the average Jo(e) on the street what marriage is,
the person generally just gets tongue-tied. Try it. The meaning
of marriage is somehow supposed to be so obvious, so
entrenched and ramified in daily life, that it is never in need of
articulation.
Standard dictionaries, which track and make coherent com-
mon usages of terms, are unhelpfully circular. Most commonly,
dictionaries define marriage in terms of spouses, spouses in
terms of husband and wife, and husband and wife in terms of
marriage. 7 In consequence, the various definitions do no work
in explaining what marriage is and so simply end up assuming or
stipulating that marriage must be between people of different
sexes.
6. See, e.g., Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (C.D. Cal. 1980)
(holding that under the Immigration and Nationality Act a gay man could not
be considered an "immediate relative" of another with whom he had lived for
years and had had a marriage ceremony). "Thus there has been for centuries a
combination of scriptural and canonical teaching under which a 'marriage'
between persons of the same sex was unthinkable and, by definition,
impossible." Id.
Similarly, in 1991, Hawaii's Director of the Department of Health argued
before Hawaii's Supreme Court: "The right of persons of the same sex to marry
one another does not exist because marriage, by definition and usage, means a
special relationship between a man and a woman." Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,
61 (Haw. 1993).
7. The Concise Oxford Dictionary, for example, offers the following
definitions:
"Marriage: relation between married persons, wedlock."
"Married: united in wedlock."
"Wedlock: the married state."
"Spouse: husband or wife."
"Husband: man joined to woman by marriage."
"Wife: married woman esp. in relation to her husband." CONCISE OXFORD
DICTIONARY 594, 746, 1241, 1478, 1493 (3d ed. 1964).
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Legal definitions of marriage fare no better. Many state laws
only speak of spouses or partners and do not actually make
explicit that people must be of different sexes to marry.' During
the early 1970s and again in the early 1980s, gays directly chal-
lenged these laws in four states, claiming that in accordance with
common law tradition, whatever is not prohibited must be
allowed, and that if these laws were judicially construed to
require different-sex partners, then the laws constituted uncon-
stitutional sex or sexual orientation discrimination.9 Gays lost all
these cases, which the courts treated in dismissive, but revealing,
fashion."0
The courts would first claim that the silence of the law
notwithstanding, marriage automatically entails gender differ-
ence. The best known of these rulings is the 1974 case Singer v.
Hara, which upheld Washington's refusal to grant a marriage
license to two males. The case defined marriage as "the legal
union of one man and one woman" as husband and wife.1 This
definition has become the legal definition of marriage, since it
has been taken up into the standard law dictionary, Black's Sixth
8. For example, "Kentucky statutes do not specifically prohibit marriage
between persons of the same sex, nor do they authorize the issuance of a
marriage license to such persons."Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky.
1973). One of the very first gay marriage cases - one from Minnesota - also
dealt with a state statute that failed to expressly prohibit same-sex marriages.
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810
(1972).
9. De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984) (two persons of the same
sex cannot contract a common law marriage notwithstanding the state's
recognition of common law marriages between persons of different sexes);
Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. 1974);Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 588; Baker, 191
N.W.2d at 185.
10. Other cases that, in one way or another, have held that gays cannot
marry are Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1119; Succession of Bascot, 502 So. 2d 1118,
1127-30 (La. 1987) (holding that a man cannot be a "concubine" of another
man); Slayton v. Texas, 633 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. 1982) (stating that same-sex
marriage is impossible in Texas); Jennings v. Jennings, 315 A.2d 816, 820 n.7
(Md. 1974) (explaining that "Maryland does not recognize a marriage between
persons of the same sex"); Dean v. District of Columbia, No. CA 90-13892, slip
op. at 18-21 (D.C. Super. CL Dec. 30, 1991) (invoking passages from Genesis,
Deuteronomy, Matthew, and Ephesians to hold that "societal recognition that it
takes a man and a woman to form a marital relationship is older than
Christianity itself"); In re Estate of Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 687 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990) (refusing to "elevat[e] homosexual unions to the same level achieved by
the marriage of two people of the opposite sex"); Anonymous v. Anonymous,
325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (stating that "[m]arriage is and
always has been a contract between a man and a woman").
11. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1193.
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Edition, where the case is the only citation given in the section on
marriage.
1 2
Yet, the Singer definition tells us nothing whatever of the
content of marriage. First, the qualification "as husband and
wife" is simply circular. Since "husband" and "wife" mean people
who are in a marriage with each other, the definition, as far as
these terms go, presupposes the very thing to be defined. So
what is left is that marriage is "the legal union of one man and
one woman." Now, if the term "legal" here simply means "not
illegal," then notice that a kiss after the prom can fit its bill: "the
legal union of one man and one woman." We are told nothing
of what "the union" is that is supposed to be the heart of mar-
riage. The formulation of the definition serves no function
other than to exclude from marriage - whatever it is - the
people whom America views as destroyers of the American fam-
ily, same-sex couples and polygamists: "one man and one woman."
Like the ordinary dictionary definitions, the legal definition does
no explanatory work."3
Nevertheless, the courts take this definition, turn around,
and say that since this is what marriage means, gender discrimina-
tion and sexual-orientation discrimination is built right into the
institution of marriage; therefore since marriage itself is permit-
ted, so too must be barring same-sex couples from it. Discrimina-
tion against gays, they hold, is not an illegitimate discrimination
in marriage, indeed it is necessary to the very institution: No one
would be married if gays were, for then marriage wouldn't be
marriage. It took a gay case to reveal what marriage is, but the
case reveals it, at least as legally understood, to be nothing but an
empty space, delimited only by what it excludes - gay couples.
And so the case has all the marks of being profoundly prejudicial
in its legal treatment of gays.
12. BLACK'S LAw DiarToNARY 972 (6th ed. 1990).
13. Even the highly analytical historian John Boswell, in his recent book
on the history of gay marriage, fares no better in coming up with a definition of
marriage: "It is my understanding that most modem speakers of English
understand the term 'marriage' to refer to what the partners expect to be a
permanent and exclusive union between two people, which would produce
legitimate children if they chose to have children, and which creates mutual
rights and responsibilities, legal, economic, and moral." JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-
SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 10 (1994); cf. id. at 190. But if one asks
"what partners?" "what union?" "what rights?" and "what responsibilities?", I
fear the answer in each instance must be "marital ones," in which case the
definition goes around in the same small circle as the law. And legitimate
children just are children of a marriage, so, that component of the definition is
circular as well.
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2. Gender in Marital Law
If we shift from considering the legal definition of marriage
to the legal practices of marriage, are there differences of gender
that insinuate themselves into marriage, so that botched defini-
tions aside, marriage does after all. require that its pairings be of
the male-female variety? There used to be major gender-based
legal differences in marriage, but these have all been found to be
unjust and have gradually been eliminated through either legisla-
tive or judicial means. For example, a husband used to have an
obligation to take care of his wife's material needs without his
wife (no matter how wealthy) having any corresponding obliga-
tion to look after her husband (however poor). Now both
spouses are mutually and equally obliged. 4 At one time a hus-
band could sell his wife's property without her consent; the wife
had no independent power to make contracts. But these laws
have not generally been in force since the middle of the last cen-
tury and are now unconstitutional. 5 It used to be that a husband
by definition could not rape his wife - one could as well rape
oneself, the reasoning went. Now, while laws governing sexual
relations between husbands and wives are not identical to those
governing relations between (heterosexual) strangers, they are
nearly so, and such differences as remain are in any case cast in
gender-neutral terms.' Wives are legally protected from ongo-
ing sexual abuse from husbands - whatever the non-legal
reality.
Now that gender distinctions have all but vanished from the
legal content of marriage, there is no basis for the requirement
that the legal form of marriage unite members of different sexes.
The legal definition of marriage - "union of one man and one
woman" - though doggedly enforced in the courts, is a dead
husk that has been, cast off by marriage as a living legal
institution. 7
14. HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 92 (2d. ed. 1986)
[hereinafter FAMILY LAW].
15. Id. at 96-103. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981)
(invalidated Louisiana's community property statute that gave the husband, as
the family's "head and master," the unilateral right to dispose of property
jointly owned with his wife without her consent).
16. FAMILY LAw, supra note 14, at 127-29.
17. "However unpleasant, outmoded or unnecessary, whatever sex
discrimination remains in family law is trivial in comparison with the inequality
of spouses that result from family facts, from the traditional role division which
places the husband into the money-earner role and the wife into the home
where she acquires neither property nor marketable skills." Id. at 146.
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3. Babies in Marital Law
Perhaps sensing the shakiness of an argument that rests
solely on a stipulative definition of little or no content, the courts
have tried to supplement the supposedly obvious requirement
for gender disparity in access to marriage with appeal to repro-
duction. By assuming that procreation and rearing of children is
essential to married life, the courts have implicitly given marriage
a functional definition designed to eliminate lesbians and gay
men from the ranks of the marriageable." "As we all know" (the
courts self-congratulatorily declare), lesbians are "constitution-
ally incapable" of bearing children by other lesbians, and gay
men are incapable of siring children by other gay men.
But the legally acknowledged institution of marriage in fact
does not track this functional definition. All states allow people
who are over sixty to marry each other, with all the rights and
obligations marriage entails, even though biological reality dic-
tates that such marriages will be sterile. In Hawaii, the statute
that requires women to prove immunity against rubella as a con-
dition for getting a marriage license exempts women "who, by
reason of age or other medically determined condition are not
and never will be physically able to conceive children." 9 In,
1984, Hawaii also amended its marriage statute to delete a
requirement that "neither of the parties is impotent-or physically
incapable of entering into the marriage state."20 This statutory
latitude belies any claim-that the narrow purpose of marriage is
to promote and protect propagation. 1
The functional definition is too broad as well. If the func-
tion of marriage is only to bear and raise children in a family
context, then the state should have no objection to the legal rec-
ognition of polygamous marriages. Male-focused polygamous
families have been efficient bearers of children; and the econo-
mies of scale afforded by polygamous families also make them
efficient in the rearing of children.22 So given the actual scope
of legal marriage, reproduction and child rearing cannot be its
purpose or primary justification.
This finding is further confirmed if we look at the rights and
obligations of marriage, which exist independently of whether a
marriage generates children and which frequently are not even
18. See Singer v. Ham, 522 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Wash. 1974).
19. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, '50 n.7 (Haw. 1993) (quoting HAw. REv.
STAT. § 572-7(a) (Supp. 1992)).
20. Id at 48 n.1 (quoting HAw. REv. STAT. § 580-21 (1985)).
21. Id. at 48.
22. See Dirk Johnson, Polygamists Emerge from Secrecy, Seeking Not Just Peace,
But Respect, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1991, at A22.
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instrumental to childbearing and rearing. While mutual material
support might be viewed as guarding (indirectly) the interests of
children, other marital rights, such as the immunity against com-
pelled testimony from a spouse, can hardly be grounded in child-
related purposes. Indeed, this immunity is waived when relations
with one's own children are what is at legal stake, as in cases of
alleged child abuse.23
The assumption that childrearing is a function uniquely
tethered to the institution of heterosexual marriage also collides
with an important but little acknowledged social reality. Many
lesbian and gay male couples already are raising families in which
children are the blessings of adoption, artificial insemination,
surrogacy, or prior marriages. The country is experiencing
something approaching a gay and lesbian baby boom. 4 Many
more gays would like to raise or foster children. A 1988 study by
the American Bar Association found that eight to ten million
children are currently being raised in three million gay and les-
bian households.25 This statistic, in turn, suggests that around
six percent of the U.S. population is made up of gay and lesbian
families with children. 6 We might well ask what conceivable
purpose can be served for these children by barring to their gay
and lesbian parents the mutual cohesion, emotional security, and
economic benefits that are ideally promoted by legal marriage.27
4. Marriage as a Creature of the State
If the desperate judicial and social attempts to restrict mar-
riage and its benefits to heterosexual parents are conceptually
disingenuous, unjust, and socially inefficient, the question arises:
what is left of marriage? Given the emptiness of its standard justi-
fications, should marriage as a legal institution simply be abol-
ished? Ought we simply to abandon the legal institution in favor
of a family policy that simply and directly looks after the interests
of children, leaving all other possible familial relations on the
same legal footing as commercial transactions?
23. FAMILY LAw, supra note 14, at 131.
24. See, e.g., Susan Chira, Gay and Lesbian Parents Grow More Visible, N.Y.
TrmEs, Sept. 30, 1993, at Al; Daniel Coleman, Gay Parents Called No Disadvantage,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at B7; Homosexuality Does Not Make Parent Unfit, Court
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1994, at A8.
25. EDITORS OF THE HARvARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE
LAw 119 (1990).
26. Craig R. Dean, Legalize Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, § 1, at
19.
27. Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A (Conservative) Case for Gay
Marriage, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 1989, at 22.
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Not quite; but to see what is left and worth saving, we need
to take a closer look at the social realities of marriage. Currently,
state-sanctioned marriage operates as a legal institution that
defines and creates social relations. The law creates the status of
husband and wife; it is not a reflection of or response to spousal
relations that exist independently of law. This notion that the
law "defines and creates social relations" can be clarified by look-
ing at another aspect of family law, one which ordinary people
might well find surprising, even shocking. If Paul consensually
sires a boy and raises the boy in the way a parent does, then we
are strongly inclined to think that he is the boy's father in every
morally relevant sense. And we expect the law to reflect this
moral status of the father. But the law does not see things this
way; it does not reflect and respond to moral reality. For if it
turns out that at the time of the boy's birth, his mother was
legally married not to Paul but to Fred, the boy is declared by law
to be Fred's son, and Paul is, legally speaking, a stranger to the
boy. If the mother subsequently leaves Paul and denies him
access to the child, Paul has no right at all even to explore legally
the possibility that he might have some legislated rights to visit
the boy - or so the Supreme Court declared in 1989.2" Here
the law defines and creates the relation of father and son -
which frequently, but only by legal accident, happens to accord
with the moral reality and lived experience of father and son.
Similarly, in the eyes of the law, marriage is not a social form
that exists independently of the law and which marriage law ech-
oes and manages. Rather, marriage is entirely a creature of the
law - or as Hawaii's Supreme Court recently put it: "Marriage is
a state-conferred legal partnership status."29
If we want to see what's left in the box of marriage, we need
to abandon this model of legal marriage as constitutive of a sta-
tus, and rather look at marriage as a form of living and repository
of norms independent of law, a moral reality that might well be
helped or hindered, but not constituted by the law." ° Further,
current legal marriage, at least as conceptualized by judges, with
28. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
29. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (Haw. 1993).
30. The Supreme Court's three "right to marry" cases implicitly
acknowledge that marriage is a social reality and repository of norms, indeed of
rights, independent of statutory law, since the right to marry is a substantive
liberty right which overrides, trumps, and voids statutory marital law. Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (voiding laws barring blacks and whites from
marrying each other); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (voiding law
barring child support scofflaws from marrying); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
94-99 (1987) (voiding regulation barring prisoners from marrying).
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its definitional entanglements with gender and procreation, is
likely to distract us from perceiving lived moral reality.
B. Marriage Defined
What is marriage? Marriage is intimacy given substance in the
medium of everyday life, the day-to-day. Marriage is the fused
intersection of love's sanctity and necessity's demand.
Not all loves or intimate relations count or should count as
marriages. Culturally, we are disinclined to think of "great loves"
as marriages. Antony and Cleopatra, Tristan and Isolde, Cathe-
rine and Heathcliff - these are loves that burn gloriously but
too intensely ever to be manifested in a medium of breakfasts
and tire changes. Nor are Americans inclined to consider as real
marriages arranged marriages between heads of state who never
see each other, for again the relations do not grow in the earth of
day-to-day living.
Friendships too are intimate relations that we do not con-
sider marital relations. Intimate relations are ones that acquire
the character they have - that are unique - because of what
the individuals in the relation bring to and make of it; the rela-
tion is a distinctive product of their separate individualities.
Thus, intimate relations differ markedly from public or commer-
cial transactions. For instance, there is nothing distinctive about
your sales clerk that bears on the meaning of your buying a pair
of socks from him. The clerk is just carrying out a role, one that
from the buyer's perspective nearly anyone could have carried
out. But while friendships are star cases of intimate relation-
ships, we do not count them as marriages; for while a person
might count on a friend in a pinch to take her to the hospital,
friendly relations do not usually manifest themselves'through
such necessities of life. Friendships are for the sake of fun, and
tend to break down when put to other uses. Friendships do not
count as marriages, for they do not develop in the medium of
necessity's demand.
On the other hand, neither do we count roommates who
regularly cook, clean, tend to household chores and share house-
hold finances as married, even though they "share the common
necessities of life." This expression is the typical phrase used to
define the threshold requirement for being considered "domes-
tic partners" in towns that have registration programs for domes-
tic partners."1 Neither would we even consider as married two
31. See, e.g., City of Berkeley, California, Domestic Partnership Policy,
Statement of General Policy, Dec. 4, 1984, quoted in HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY
LAw: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 159 (3d. ed. 1990).
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people who were roommates and even blended their finances if
that is all their relationship comprised. Sharing the day-to-day is,
at best, an ingredient of marriage.
Marriage requires the presence and blending of both neces-
sity and intimacy. Life's necessities are a mixed fortune: on the
one hand, they frequently are drag, dross, and cussedness, yet on
the other hand, they can constitute opportunity, abidingness,
and prospect for nurture. They are the field across which, the
medium through which, and the ground from which the intima-
cies which we consider marital flourish, blossom, and come to
fruition.
III. THE NoRMATIvE AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCE OF MARRIAGE
A. The Legal Rights and Benefits of Marriage
This required blend of intimacy and everyday living explains
much of the legal content of marriage. For example, the
required blend means that for the relationship to work, there
must be a presumption of trust between partners; and, in turn,
when the relationship is working, there will be a transparency in
the flow of information between partners - they will know virtu-
ally everything about each other. This pairing of trust and trans-
parency constitutes the moral ground for the common law right
against compelled testimony between spouses, and explains why
this same immunity is not extended to (mere) friends."
The remaining vast array of legal rights and benefits of mar-
riage fit equally well this matrix of love and necessity - chiefly
by promoting the patient tendance that such life requires (by
providing for privacy, nurture, support, persistence) and by pro-
tecting against the occasions when necessity is cussed rather than
opportune, especially when life is marked by crisis, illness and
destruction."3
First and foremost, state-recognized marriage changes stran-
gers-at-law into next-of-kin with all the rights which this status
entails. These rights include: the right to enter hospitals, jails
and other places restricted to "immediate family;" the right to
32. See FAMILY LAw, supra note 14, at 131-132.
33. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 59 (catalogues the most salient rights and benefits
that are contingent upon marital status). The benefits discussed in this section
are drawn from this case and from a catalogue of marital privileges given in a
1993 Georgia Supreme Court case, Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853 (Ga.
1993) (Sears-Collins, J., concurring) (holding that a state law authorizing cutoff
of alimony payments to a former spouse who enters into a voluntary
cohabitation does not apply when the cohabitation in question is a lesbian
one). See also I HAYDEN CuRRY & DENIS CurFoRD, A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN
AND GAY CouPLEs 2 (R. Leonard ed., 6th ed. 1991).
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obtain "family" health insurance and bereavement leave; the
right to live in neighborhoods zoned "single family only;" and
the right to make medical decisions in the event a partner is
injured or incapacitated.
Both from the partners themselves and from the state, mar-
riage provides a variety of material supports which ameliorate, to
a degree, necessity's unfriendly intervals. Marriage requires
mutual support between spouses. It provides income tax advan-
tages, including deductions, credits, improved rates, and exemp-
tions. It provides for enhanced public assistance in times of
need. It governs the equitable control, division, acquisition, and
disposition of community property. At death, it guarantees
rights of inheritance in the absence of wills - a right of special
benefit to the poor, who frequently die intestate. For the
wealthy, marriage virtually eliminates inheritance taxes between
spouses, since spouses as of 1981 can make unlimited untaxed
gifts to each other even at death. 4 For all, it exempts property
from attachments resulting from one partner's debts. It confers
a right to bring a wrongful death suit. And it confers the right to
receive survivor's benefits.
Several marital benefits promote a couple's staying together
in the face of changed circumstances. Included in the benefits
are the right to collect unemployment benefits if one partner
quits her job to move with her partner to a new location because
the partner has obtained a new job there, and the right to obtain
residency status for a noncitizen partner. Currently lesbians and
gay men are denied all of these rights in consequence of being
barred access to legal marriage, even though these rights and
benefits are as relevant to committed gay relationships as to het-
erosexual marriages.
B. The Structuring of Lesbian and Gay Relationships
The portraits of gay and lesbian committed relationships
that emerge from ethnographic studies suggest that in the way
they typically arrange their lives, gay and lesbian couples fulfill in
an exemplary manner the definition of marriage developed
here. 5
34. FAMILY LAw, supra note 14, at 107.
35. See ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY
OF DIVERsITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978); PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER
ScHwARTz, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX (1983); DAVID P.
MCWHIRTER & ANDREW M. MATTISON, THE MALE COUPLE: How RELATIONSHIPS
DEVELOP (1984); SUZANNE SHERMAN, LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGES: PRIVATE
COMMITMENTS, PUBLIC CEREMONIES (1992); KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE
CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1991).
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In gay relationships, the ways in which the day-to-day
demands of necessity are typically fulfilled are themselves vehi-
cles for the development of intimacy. It is true that gay and les-
bian relationships generally divide duties between the partners
- this is the efficient thing to do, the very first among the econo-
mies of scale that coupledom affords. But the division of duties
is in the first instance a matter of personal preference and joint
planning, in which decisions are made in part with an eye to who
is better at doing any given task and who has free time - say, for
ironing or coping with car dealerships. But adjustments are
made in cases where one person is better at most things, or even
everything. In these cases, the relation is made less efficient for
the sake of equality between partners, who willingly end up doing
things they would rather not do. Such joint decisions are made
not from a sense of traditionally assigned duty and role, but from
each partner's impulse to help out, a willingness to sacrifice, and
a commitment to equality.3 6 In these ways, both the develop-
ment of intimacy through choice and the proper valuing of love
are interwoven in the day-to-day activities of gay couples. Choice
improves intimacy. Choice makes sacrifices meaningful. Choice
gives love its proper weight.
C. Weddings and Licensing Considered
If this analysis of the nature of marriage is correct, then mis-
guided is the requirement, found in most states, that beyond
securing from government a marriage license, the couple, in
order to be certifiably married, must also undergo a ceremony of
solemnization, either in a church or before a justice of the
peace.3 7 For people are mistaken to think that the sacred valu-
ing of love is something that can be imported from the outside,
in public ceremonies invoking praise from God or community.31
Even wedding vows can smack of cheap moral credit, since they
are words, not actions. The sacred valuing of love must come
from within and realize itself over time through little sacrifices in
day-to-day existence. In this way, intimacy takes on weight and
shine, the ordinary becomes the vehicle of the extraordinary,
and the development of the marital relation becomes a mirror
reflecting eternity. It is more proper to think of weddings with
their ceremonial trappings and invocations as bon voyages than as
a social institution which, echoing the legal institution of mar-
36. See WEsTON, supra note 35, at 149-50.
37. FAmILY LAw, supra note 14, at 47-48.
38. On sacred values, see generally Douglas MacLean, Social Values and the
Distribution of Risk, in VALuES AT RISK 85-93 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986).
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riage, defines and confers marital status. In a gay marriage, the
sanctifications that descend instantly through custom and ritual
in many heterosexual marriages descend gradually over and
through time - and in a way they are better for it. For the
sacred values and loyal intimacies contained in such a marriage
are a product of the relation itself, they are truly the couple's
own.
The model of marriage advanced here is highly compatible
with, indeed it recommends, what has been, until recently, by far
the most usual form of marriage in western civilization, namely,
common law marriage - in which there is no marriage license
or solemnization. Currently only about one-fourth of the states
legally acknowledge common law marriages, but over the largest
stretches of western civilization, legally certifiable marriage was
an arrangement limited almost exclusively to the wealthy, the
noble - in short, the few. 9
In a common law arrangement, the marriage is at some
point, as the need arises, culturally and legally acknowledged in
retrospect as having existed all along. It is important to remem-
ber that as matter of law, the standard requirement of living
together seven years is entirely evidentiary and not at all constitu-
tive of the relation as a marriage.40 So, for example, a child born
in the third year of a common law marriage is legitimate from
the moment of its birth and need not wait four years as Mom and
Dad log seven years together. The marriage was there in sub-
stance all along. The social and legal custom of acknowledging
common law marriage gives an adequately robust recognition to
marriage as a lived arrangement and as a repository of values.
The securing of a marriage license is something the state
may well want to encourage as a useful device in the administra-
tion the legal benefits of marriage. But the licensing should not
be seen as what legally constitutes the marriage when questions
arise over whether the marriage in fact exists (say, in paternity,
custody, or inheritance disputes). In turn, it is completely legiti-
mate for the state to terminate marital benefits if in fact the
couple gets a license but is not fulfilling the definition of mar-
riage as a living arrangement. The state already investigates such
cases of fraud when marriage licenses are secured simply to
acquire an enhanced immigration status for one of the licen-
39. FAMILY LAw, supra note 14, at 50. For a review of the literature on the
vagaries of marriage as an institution, see Lawrence Stone, Sex in the West: The
Strange History of Human Sexuality, NEW REPUBLC, July 8, 1985, at 25-37. See also
BoswELL, supra note 13, at 32-33, 35.
40. FAMILY LAw, supra note 14, at 49.
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sees.41  Indeed, that immigration fraud through marriage
licenses is even conceptually possible is a tacit recognition that
marriage simpliciter is marriage as a lived arrangement, while
legally certified marriage is and should be viewed as epiphe-
nomenonal or derivative - and not vice versa.
D. The Relation between Love and Justice
If intimate or private relations of a certain quality provide
the content of marriage, what can the law and public policy pro-
vide to marriage? Why do we need legal marriage at all? Folk
wisdom has it that both love and justice are blind. But they are
blind in different ways, ways which reveal possible conflicts and
tensions between love and justice in practice.42
Justice is blind - blindfolded - so that it may be a system
of neutral, impersonal, impartial rules, a governance by laws, not
by idiosyncratic, biased, or self-interested persons. Principles of
justice in the modern era have been confected chiefly with an eye
to relations at arm's length and apply paradigmatically to compe-
titions conducted between conflicting interests in the face of
scarce resources. Equal respect is the central concern of
43justice.
Love is blind - (as the song goes) blinded by the light -
because the lover is stutteringly bedazzled by the beloved. In
love, we overlook failings in those whom we cherish. And the
beloved's happiness, not the beloved's respect, is love's central
concern.
Within the family, we agree that the distribution of goods
should be a matter of feeling, care, concern, and sacrifice rather
than one conducted by appeal to impartial and impersonal prin-
ciples of equity. Indeed, if the impersonal principles of justice
are constantly in the foreground of familial relations, intimacy is
destroyed. If every decision in a family requires a judicial-like
determination that each member got an equal share, then the
care, concern, and love that are a family's breath and spirit are
dead. Justice should not be front and center in family life.
But love may lead to intolerable injustices, even as a spinoff
effect of one of its main virtues. In the blindness of love, people
will love even those who beat them and humiliate them. Con-
41. Id. at 47.
42. This section draws on some ideas in. Claudia Mills & Douglas
MacLean, Love and Justice, QQ: REPORT FROM THE INSTITUTE FOR PHILOSOPHY
AND PUBLIC POLICY, Fall 1989, at 12-15.
43. For a classic statement of this position, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180-83, 272-78 (Harvard Univ. Press 1978) (1977).
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versely, aggressors in these cases will feel more free to aggress
against a family member than a stranger exactly because the fam-
ily is the realm of love rather than of civic respect. Some of these
humiliations are even occasioned by the distinctive opportunities
afforded by traditional family life - in particular, society's mis-
guided notion that everything that occurs behind the family's
four walls is private, and so beyond legitimate inquiry.
Conflicts between love and justice can be relieved if we view
marriage as a legal institution that allows for appeals to justice
when they are needed. Justice should not be the motivation for
loving relations, but neither should love and family exist beyond
the reach of justice. Justice needs to be a reliable background
and foundation for family life. Therefore, legal marriage should
be viewed as a nurturing ground for social marriage, and not (as
now) as that which legally defines and creates marriage and so
tends to preclude legal examination of it.
E. The Contribution of Minorities to Family Law Reform
Marriage law should be a conduit for justice in moments of
crisis - in financial collapse, in illness, at death - to guard
against exploitation both in general and in the distinctive forms
that marriage allows.
And indeed family law reform has generally been moving in
this direction. State-defined marriage is an evolving institution,
not an eternal verity. As noted, inequitable distributions of
power by gender have been all but eliminated as a legally
enforced part of marriage.44 People at the margins of society
have frequently provided the beacon for reform in family law.
Already by the 1930s, black American culture no longer stigma-
tized children born out of wedlock, though whites continued to
do so.45 In 1968, the Supreme Court belatedly came to realize
that punitively burdening innocent children is profoundly
unjust, and subsequently, through a series of some thirty
Supreme Court cases, illegitimacy has all but vanished as a condi-
tion legally affecting children born out of wedlock.46 Further,
black Americans provided to the mainstream the model of the
extended family with its major virtue of a certain amount of open
texture and play in the joints. In 1977, this virtue too was given
constitutional status when the Supreme Court struck down zon-
44. See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
45. GUNNAR MviwA., AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 935 (Harper & Row 1962)
(1944).
46. FAMILY LAW, supra note 14, at 154-55.
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ing laws that discriminated against extended, typically black,
families.47
Currently society and its discriminatory impulse make gay
coupling very difficult. It is hard for people to live together as
couples without having their sexual orientation perceived in the
public realm, which in turn targets them for discrimination.
Sharing a life in hiding is even more constricting than life in a
nuclear family. Members of nongay couples are here asked to
imagine what it would take to erase every trace of their own sex-
ual orientation for even one week. Still, despite oppressive odds,
gays have shown an amazing tendency to nest.48 And those les-
bian and gay male couples who have persevered show that the
structure of more usual couplings is not a matter of destiny, but
of personal responsibility. The so-called basic unit of society
turns out not to be a unique immutable atom; it can adopt differ-
ent parts, and be adapted to different needs.
F. Gay Couples as Models of Family Life
Gay life, like black culture, might even provide models and
materials for rethinking family life and improving family law. I
will now chart some ways in which this might be so - in particu-
lar drawing on the distinctive experience and ideals of gay male
couples.4 9
Take sex. Traditionally, a commitment to monogamy - to
the extent that it was not simply an adjunct of property law, a
vehicle for guaranteeing property rights and succession - was
the chief mode of sacrifice imposed upon or adopted by married
couples as a means of showing their sacred valuing of their rela-
tion. But gay men have realized that while couples may choose
to restrict sexual activity in order to show their love for each
other, it is not necessary for this purpose; there are many other
ways to manifest and ritualize commitment. And so monogamy
(it appears) is not an essential component of love and marriage.
The authors of The Male Couple found that:
47. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
48. See supra note 35 (studies of gay couples).
49. Lesbian legal theorists have generally supposed marriage too sexist an
institution to be salvaged, and lesbian moral theorists also have found
traditional forms of coupling highly suspect. Some recommend communal
arrangements as the ideal for lesbians. Others have proposed that lovers
should not even live together. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a
Path to Liberation?, Outr/LooK, Fall 1989, at 9, 14-17; Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will
Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle
the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage" 79 VA. L. REv. 1535 (1993); SARAH
LuciA HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETHics: TowARD NEW VALUE (1988); CLAUDIA CARD,
LESBIAN CHOICES (1994).
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[T] he majority of [gay male] couples, and all of the couples
together for longer than five years, were not continuously
sexually exclusive with each other. Although many had
long periods of sexual exclusivity, it was not the ongoing
expectation for most. We found that gay men expect
mutual emotional dependability with their partners [but
also believe] that relationship fidelity transcends concerns
about sexuality and exclusivity 5 °
Both because marital sacrifices must be voluntary to be meaning-
ful and because sexual exclusivity is not essential to marital com-
mitment, the law should not impose monogamy on married
couples. And indeed, half the states have decriminalized
adultery.51
Other improvements that take their cue from gay male cou-
plings might include a recognition that marriages evolve over
time. The Male Couple distinguishes six stages that couples typi-
cally pass through: blending (year one), nesting (years two and
three), maintaining (years four and five), building (years six
though ten), releasing (years eleven through twenty), and
renewing (beyond twenty years).52 Relations initially submerge
individuality, and emphasize equality between partners, though
the equality usually at first takes the form of complementarity
rather than similarity.53 With the passage of years individuality
reemerges. Infatuation gives way to collaboration. The develop-
ment of a foundational trust between the partners and a blend-
ing of finances and possessions, interestingly enough, occurs
much later in the relationship - typically after ten years.54
While the most important factor in keeping men together over
the first ten years is finding compatibility, the most important
factor for the second decade is a casting off of possessiveness,
even as the men's lives become more entwined materially and by
the traditions and rituals they have established.
The fact that relations evolve makes the top-down model of
legal marriage as creator of relations particularly inappropriate
for human life. Currently at law, the only recognition that mar-
riages change and gather moral weight with time, is the vesting
of one spouse's (typically the wife's) interests in the other's
Social Security benefits after ten years of marriage.55 More needs
to be explored along these lines. For example, one spouse's
50. MCWHIRTER & MATrISON, supra note 35, at 285.
51. FAMILY LAw, supra note 14, at 130.
52. MCWHIRTER & MATrISON, supra note 35, at 15-17.
53. 1& at 31-33.
54. 1& at 104-05.
55. FAMILY LAW, supra note 14, at 369, 386.
THE CASE FOR GAY MARRIAGE
guaranteed share of the other's inheritance might rise with the
logging of years, rather than being the same traditionally fixed,
one-third share, both on day one of the marriage and at its fifti-
eth anniversary.56 Men's relations also suggest, however, that the
emphasis that has been put on purely material concerns, like
blended finances, as the marks of a relation in domestic partner-
ship legislation and in a number of gay family law cases is mis-
guided and fails to understand the dynamics and content of gay
relations.57
In gay male relations, the relation itself frequently is exper-
ienced as a third element or "partner" over and above the two
men.5" This third element frequently has a physical embodiment
in a home, business, joint avocation, or companion animal, but
also frequently consists of joint charitable, civil, political, or reli-
gious work. The third element of the relation both provides a
focus for the partners and relieves some of the confining
centrifugal pressures frequently found in small families.
Whether this might have legal implications deserves exploration
- it certainly provides a useful model for small heterosexual
families.
All long-term gay male relationships, The Male Couple
reports, devise their own special ways of making the relations sat-
isfying: "Their styles of relationship were developed without the
56. Id at 104.
57. I am thinking in particular of the 1989 case, Braschi v. Stahl, 543
N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989), in which New York's highest court ruled that two men
who had been living together for years with blended finances - whom the
court called "unmarried lifetime partners" - qualified as "family members" for
the purposes of New York's law governing succession rights on apartment
leases. At the time, this was considered the most progressive gay family law case
of record. And in one regard the case was progressive. It proposed that the
concept "family" should be given an operational definition: if it waddles, flaps,
and quacks like a family, then it is a family. But then the case went on to dwell
almost exclusively on the material and monetary side of life, so much so that in
the end it appeared almost to be a case promoting property rights rather
familial relations. And indeed this case has had no progeny.
Two years later, the same court abandoned any effort to define family
relationships operationally or functionally and held that a lesbian had no rights
at all to visit a daughter whom she had jointly reared with the girl's biological
mother. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). Here only biology
mattered. The same court held later that year that grandparents do have a
right to visit their grandchildren even over the objections of both parents. In re
Emanuel S., 577 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1991). Clearly much work remains to be done
in bring law into accord with what families and marriages functionally are and
operationally do. Mere reference to the material circumstances of marriage will
not do that work.
58. MCWHIRTER & MATrISON, supra note 35, at 285.
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aid of visible role models available to heterosexual couples."59
This strongly suggests that legal marriage ought not to enforce
any tight matrix of obligations on couples if their long-term hap-
piness is part of the laws' stake. Rather the law ought to provide
a ground in which relations can grow and change and even rec-
ognize their own endings.
IV. CONCLUSION: RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL REFORMS AFOOT
Given the nature of marriage and the nature of gay rela-
tions, it is time for the law to let them merge. And indeed there
have been some general legal, social, and cultural shifts in the
direction of acknowledging and supporting gay marriages. On
January 1, 1995, gay marriages will become legal in Sweden; they
have already become legal in Denmark (in 1989) and Norway (in
1993).60
In 1993, Hawaii's Supreme Court ruled that Hawaii's mar-
riage laws, which the court interpreted as requiring spouses to be
of different sexes, presumptively violate Hawaii's Equal Rights
Amendment, which bars sex discrimination. The court ruled
that the laws could only be upheld on remand if shown to be
necessary to further a compelling state interest.61 The court
preemptively found illegitimate the two standard justifications
that have been used in other jurisdictions to claim state interests
in restricting marriage to different-sex couples - namely,
appeals to the very definition of marriage and to procreation.
62
It looks promising, then, that the court will strike down the ban
on same-sex marriages. And if one is married in Hawaii, one is
married everywhere - thanks both to common law tradition and
to the U.S. Constitution's full faith and credit clause.63
59. Id. at 286.
60. A Swede Deal for Couples, ADVOCATE, July 12, 1994, at 16.
61. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 60-68 (Haw. 1993). Subsequently,
Hawaii's legislature voted that marriages in Hawaii must have mixed-sex
partners; but since the court had already evaluated this condition in its
constitutional analysis of Hawaii's laws, the legislature's vote seems to be a case
of moral grandstanding and political posturing. Hawaii Legislature Blocks Gay
Marriage, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 27, 1994, at A18.
62. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48 n.1, 61 (Haw. 1993).
63. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Gay marriage is also gradually coming into law through the back door of
same-sex second parent adoptions. At least six states have allowed the lesbian
partner of a woman with a child to adopt - become the second mother of -
the child. But if Heather has at law two moms, what is the relation between her
two parents? Strangers at law? Surely not. Court Grants Parental Rights to Mother
of Lesbian Lover, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, § 1, at 42.
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As a matter of general cultural perception, recognitions of
same-sex domestic partnerships are baby steps toward the legali-
zation of gay marriage. A number of prestigious universities
(including Harvard, Columbia, Stanford, the University of Chi-
cago, and the University of Iowa), and prestigious corporations
(including AT&T, Bank of America, Levi Strauss and Company,
Lotus Development Corp., Apple Computer, Inc., Warner Broth-
ers, MCA/ Universal Inc., The New York Times and Time Maga-
zine) have extended to their employees' same-sex partners
domestic partnership benefits, which include many of the privi-
leges extended to their employees' heterosexual spouses. 4
These benefits typically include health insurance. Approximately
thirty municipalities, beginning with Berkeley in 1984 and
including San Francisco, Seattle, and New York City, have done
the same, establishing in some cases a system of civic registrations
for same-sex couples.65
In June 1994, Vermont became the first state to extend
health insurance coverage to the same-sex partners of its state
workers.66 In August 1994, the California legislature passed a bill
to establish a registry of domestic partners for both mixed-sex
and same-sex couples and gave the partners three legal rights: 1)
access to each other when one of them is hospitalized, 2) the use
of California's short form will to designate each other as primary
beneficiaries, and, most importantly, 3) the establishment of
one's partner as conservator if one is incapacitated.67 On Sep-
tember 11th, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed the legislation, issu-
ing a veto message that failed even to acknowledge the bill's
impact on the lives of California's gay couples.'
In 1984, the General Assembly of the Unitarian-Universalist
Association voted to "affirm the growing practice of some of its
ministers in conducting services of union of gay and lesbian
couples and urges member societies to support their ministers in
64. 2 Universities Give Gay Partners Same Benefits as Married Couples, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1992, at A10; Domestic Partnership Benefits Found Not to Increase
Employer Costs, WINDY Criv TIMES, June 4, 1992, at 9; FRONTIERS (Los Angeles),
Oct. 7, 1994, at 16.
65. Workers' Partners Get Benefit of Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1993,
§ 1, at 40.
66. Vermont Union Wins Benefits for Partners, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1994, at
A12. In some jurisdictions, including Vermont, such benefits are also extended
to unmarried but cohabiting heterosexual couples.
67. Senate Passes Historic Domestic Partners Bill, FRoNTIERS (Los Angeles),
Sept. 9, 1994, at 17.
68. Domestic Partner Bill Vetoed in California, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1994, at
A6; see FROtIMERS (Los Angeles), Oct. 7, 1994, at 36.
238 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9
this important aspect of our movement's ministry to the gay and
lesbian community."69
In October 1993, the General Assembly of the Union of
American Hebrew Congregations - which is the federation of
U.S. and Canadian Reform synagogues - adopted a resolution
calling for the legal and social recognition and support of gay
domestic partners.7 °
Mainline Protestant denominations have ceased full scale
attacks on gay and lesbian relationships and are struggling with
the issue of blessing them.71 In June 1994, the General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) came within a few votes of
permitting minsters to bless same-sex unions.72 Also in June
1994, a draft proposal by the Episcopal bishops, after describing
homosexuality as an orientation of "a significant minority of per-
sons" that "cannot usually be reversed," went on to say that sexual
relationships work best within the context of a committed life-
long union: "We believe this is as true for homosexual relation-
ships as for heterosexual relationships and that such
relationships need and should receive the pastoral care of the
church."73 In October 1993, a draft report by a national
Lutheran study group on sexuality had called for the blessing
and even legal acknowledgement of loving gay relationships.
74
69. Paul H. Landen, Unitarian-Universalist Views on Issues in Human
Sexuality 134 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Michigan State University).
70. General Assembly, Union of American Hebrew Congregations,
Recognition For Lesbian and Gay Partnerships (Oct. 21-25, 1993).
71. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L.
REv. 1419, 1497-1502 (1993).
72. Presbyterians Try to Resolve Long Dispute, N.Y. TimSs, June 17, 1994, at
A9.
73. Episcopal Draft on Sexuality Tries to Take a Middle Course, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 26, 1994, § 1, at 9.
74. Lutherans to Decide Whether to Sanction Homosexual Unions, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 21, 1993, at Al; Lutheran Church Stalled in Drafting Sex Statement, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 26, 1993, at A14.
In marked contrast, the Catholic Church has dug in its heels on the issue.
In February 1994, Pope John Paul II issued a 100 page "Letter to Families."
Among other things, the letter sent a message to Catholics to refrain from
supporting the notion of gay and lesbian marriages, calling such unions "a
serious threat to the family and society" and viewing them as "inappropriately
conferring an institutional value on deviant behavior." The Pope's own
definition of marriage, however, seems to be as circular in its exclusion of gays
as those definitions explored above (See supra part II, A.1): "Marriage . . . is
constituted by the covenant whereby a man and a woman establish between
themselves a partnership for their whole life." Pope Calls Gay Marriage Threat to
Family, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 23, 1994, at A2. The complete English language text of
the Letter is published in 23:37 Origins: CNS Documentary Service (March 3,
1994) 637-59.
1 THE CASE FOR GAY MARRIAGE
These actions addressing the material dimensions of gay
relationships through domestic partnership legislation and the
spiritual dimensions of gay relationships through holy union cer-
emonies constitute true moral progress if they are steps toward
the full legal and religious recognition of gay marriages. They
are morally suspect, though, if they simply end up establishing
and then entrenching a system of gay relations as separate but
equal to heterosexual ones. To move from a position of no gay
blessings and privileges to a structure of separate blessings and
privileges is to traverse only the moral ground from the Supreme
Courts's 1857 Dred Scott ruling upholding the form of white
supremacy under which blacks could not marry at all - slavery
- to its 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson ruling upholding the reign of
white supremacy that allowed blacks to marry blacks but not to
marry whites.
Whether domestic partnership legislation is a stepping-stone
or a distracting impediment to gay marriage cannot be known
categorically. Whether it is one or the other depends on a
number of factors: the specific content of the legislation, the
social circumstances of its passage, and the likely social conse-
quences of its passage. I conjecture that states will take the route
of domestic partnership legislation until they find out that a "sep-
arate but equal" structuring of gay and nongay relationships is
hopelessly unwieldy. Then states will resort to the benefits of
simplicity and recognize gay marriages straight out.
If the analysis of marriage in this article is correct, then mar-
riage, like knowledge, is a common good, one which any number
of people can share without its diminution for any one of the
sharers. So heterosexuals have nothing to lose from the institu-
tionalization of gay marriage. And the legalization of gay mar-
riage is a moral advance over mere civil rights legislation. For
civil rights legislation tends to treat gayness as though it were a
property, like having an eye color or wearing an earring, which
one could have in isolation from all other people. But gay mar-
riage is an acknowledgement that gayness, like loving and caring,
is a relational property, a connection between persons, a human
bonding, one in need of tendance and social concern.
75. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In 1883, the Supreme Court in a cursory
opinion had upheld against constitutional challenge anti-miscegenation laws.
Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). These laws were finally struck down in
1967. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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